To achieve an intended objective, an adversary may conduct an advanced persistent threat (APT) campaign against a targeted cyber network. Before an APT attack is launched, the attacker must maximize the effectiveness of the attack by properly allocating available APT resource. This paper addresses the APT effectiveness maximization problem.
Introduction
Modern society has come to depend heavily on cyberspace supported by computers and communication technologies. On one hand, public affairs, such as public traffic, water and electricity supply, banking and finance, and government sectors, are operated by computers in cyberspace. On the other hand, personal affairs, such as work, learning, communication, shopping and investment, are often managed through digital devices connected to the Internet.
While cyberspace has offered us enormous benefits, it is vulnerable to a wide range of cyber threats. Sophisticated cyber actors and nation-states could exploit cyber vulnerabilities to perform illegal actions such as steal information/money and disrupt/destroy essential services. In light of the risk and potential consequences of cyber attacks, strengthening the security and resilience of cyberspace has become an important mission [1, 2] .
Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are a new class of cyber attacks, which have the following characteristics:
(a) APTs have a clear goal and are highly targeted, (b) APTs are well-organized and well-resourced, (c) APTs last for a long time, until the intended goal is achieved, and (d) APTs are conducted covertly, employing various evasive techniques [3] [4] [5] . The APT poses a severe threat to cyberspace, because it renders conventional cyber defense mechanisms invalid. In the last decade, the number of APTs increased rapidly and numerous security incidents were reported all over the world [6] . To resist against APT attack, it is critical to understand APTs through modeling and analysis. Unfortunately, conventional methods for modeling cyber attacks, such as attack graph [7, 8] , kill chain [9] and diamond model [10] , fail to model APTs [11] .
In general, APTs are continuous-time and network-targeting. Hence, an APT-related cyber attack-defense process should be modeled as a continuous-time dynamical system accommodating the topological structure of the targeted cyber network. The individual-level dynamical modeling technique, which has been applied successfully to epidemic spreading [12, 13] , malware spreading [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] , rumor spreading [23, 24] and viral marketing [25] , meet this requirement. Towards this direction, a number of APT-related cyber attack-defense dynamic models have been proposed [26] [27] [28] . On this basis, Xu [29, 30] introduced the notion of cybersecurity dynamics, with the goal of developing effective defensive mechanisms for cyber networks, ranging from enterprise networks and financial networks to military communication networks, by modeling and analyzing dynamic cyber attack-defense processes.
Before an APT attack is launched, the attacker must maximize the effectiveness of the attack by elaborately allocating available APT resource. This paper focuses on the APT effectiveness maximization problem. First, an APT-related cyber attack-defense process is modeled as an individual-level dynamical system, and the APT effectiveness maximization problem is modeled as a constrained optimization problem. Second, a type of good APT resource allocation schemes, which are known as Genetic-Algorithm-Based (GAB) schemes, are derived by solving the established optimization problem using a well-designed genetic algorithm. Next, the influences of different factors, including the available APT resource per unit time, the attack duration and the network heterogeneity, on the cost effectiveness of a GAB scheme are concluded through computer simulations. Finally, five types of heuristic APT resource allocation schemes are considered, and an experimental comparison among the cost effectiveness of these schemes and GAB schemes is conducted. This work helps understand the pros and cons of APTs.
The subsequent materials are organized in this fashion. Section 2 models the optimal resource allocation problem for APTs. Section 3 proposes and studies GAB resource allocation schemes. Section 4 examines five types of heuristic resource allocation schemes. This work is closed by Section 5.
The modeling of the APT effectiveness maximization problem
Imagine a cyber scenario in which there are two opponents, who are referred to as the attacker and the defender, respectively. Suppose the defender owns a network of computers, the attacker is aware of the defensive mechanism for the network, and the attacker intends to conduct an APT campaign against the network. Before an attack is launched, the attacker must set out to deal with the following problem.
APT effectiveness maximization problem: Maximize the effectiveness of an APT attack by properly allocating the available APT resource.
The goal of this section is to model this problem.
Preliminary notations
For an undirected graph G = (V, E), let deg G (u) denote the degree of node u.
Let deg(G) denote the average degree of G.
The cyber network
Suppose the network owned by the defender consists of N hosts labelled 1, 2, · · · , N. Let G = (V, E) denote the topology graph of the network, where each node represents a host, and there is an edge from node i to node j if and only if host i is allowed to deliver messages directly to host j. Let A(G) = a i j N×N denote the adjacency matrix for G. The rank of node i in G, denoted w i , is defined as its out-degree.
This implies that a node with higher rank is more influential.
In what follows, it is assumed that, at any time, every node in the network is either secure or compromised, where a node is secure means that it is under the defender's control, while a node is compromise refers to that it is under the attacker's control. Let X i (t) = 0 and 1 denote that node i is secure and compromised at time t, respectively. Then the state of the network at time t can be represented by the vector
Let S i (t) and C i (t) denote the probability of node i being secure and compromised at time t, respectively. That is,
As S i (t) + C i (t) ≡ 1, the vector C(t) = (C 1 (t), · · · , C N (t)) T represents the expected state of the network at time t.
The attack mechanism
The threat of an APT to the network is twofold, which is described below.
• External attack, which is conducted by the attacker from outside of the network, so as to compromise the secure nodes in the network. Let α denote the technical level of external attack. Let x i denote the APT resource per unit time allocated for attacking secure node i. Then the attack strength to node i is measured by αx i . We refer to the vector x = (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x N ) as an APT resource allocation scheme.
• Internal infection, which is caused by the compromised nodes in the network, so as to compromise the secure nodes in the network. Let β denote the technical level of infection. Then the infection strength of a compromised node i on a secure node j is measured by βa i j .
The defense mechanism
The defense of the network against APTs is twofold, which is presented as follows.
• Prevention, which aims to protect secure nodes in the network from being compromised. Let δ denote the technical level of prevention, and suppose the resource per unit time allocated for protecting a secure node is linearly proportional to the rank of the node. Then the prevention strength of secure node i is measured by δw i .
• Reaction, which is intended to recover compromised nodes in the network. Let γ denote the technical level of reaction, and suppose the resource per unit time for recovering a compromised node is linearly proportional to the rank of the node. Then the reaction strength of compromised node i is measured by γw i .
The cyber attack-defense model
Suppose an APT starts at time t = 0 and terminates at time t = T . Below are basic assumptions about cyber attack-defense processes as follows.
(A 1 ) The loss per unit time caused by compromised node i is w i . This assumption is rational, because the loss caused by a compromised node is proportional to the rank of the node.
(A 2 ) Due to external attack and prevention, at any time secure node i gets compromised at rate
. This assumption is rational, because the rate is proportional to the attack strength and is inversely proportional to the prevention strength.
(A 3 ) Due to internal infection and prevention, at any time secure node i gets compromised at rate
, where 1 A stands for the indicator function of set A. This assumption is rational because the rate is proportional to the combined infection strength and is inversely proportional to the prevention strength.
(A 4 ) Due to reactions, at any time compromised node i becomes secure at rate γw i .
We are ready to derive a dynamic model for the cyber attack/defense process. Let ∆t be a very small time interval.
Following the previous assumptions, we have
Invoking the total probability formula, rearranging the terms, dividing both sides by ∆t, and letting ∆t → 0, we get a dynamic model as follows.
We refer to the model as Secure 
Modeling the APT effectiveness maximization problem
The expected effectiveness of the APT resource allocation scheme x, denoted E(x), is naturally defined as the expected loss of the network during the time interval [0, T ] inflicted by x. Following assumption (A 1 ), we have
On the other hand, the overall APT resource consumed according to the APT resource allocation scheme x is
where ||x|| 1 = N i=1 x i stands for the one-norm of vector x. So, the expected cost effectiveness of the APT resource allocation scheme x is given by
Let R denote the available APT resource per unit time. Based on the above discussions, the APT effectiveness maximization problem comes down to the following constrained optimization problem.
As a result, elaborating an APT resource allocation scheme boils down to finding a good solution to the optimization problem.
A type of good APT resource allocation schemes
The optimization problem (P) is highly complex, because the objective function is higher-dimensional and highly nonlinear, and the constraints are dynamic. Hence, it is computationally prohibitive to find an optimal solution to the problem.
GAB schemes
Genetic algorithms are recognized as an effective approach to finding a good solution to a complex optimization problem [31, 32] . Now, let us describe a genetic algorithm for solving the optimization problem (P) as follows.
Algorithm 1 GAB
Input An instance of the optimization problem (P), population size M, termination number .
Output An APT resource allocation scheme for the instance.
1: Generate an initial population S in a random way;
2: k := 0; E(0) := max x∈S E(x);
choose a pair of APT resource allocation schemes, x 1 and x 2 , randomly from S ; 6: let x 11 be the first half of x 1 , x 22 the second half of x 2 ;
7: 
S := (S − {x 1 , x 2 }) ∪ {y 1 , y 2 };
10:
11: end while 12: return arg max x∈S E(x).
We refer to APT resource allocation schemes obtained by running the GAB algorithm as Genetic-Algorithm-Based (GAB) schemes. Clearly, the effectiveness of a GAB scheme is dependent upon the population size.
Next, let us inspect the influence of different factors, including the available APT resource per unit time, the attack duration and the heterogeneity of the cyber network, on the cost effectiveness of a GAB scheme through computer simulations. In the following experiments, M = 10 3 , = 10 −8 , and the cyber network is chosen from the six nonisomorphic trees shown in Fig. 2 .
Figure 2: Six non-isomorphic trees with six nodes and five edges.
The influence of the available APT resource per unit time
First, let us examine the influence of the available APT resource per unit time on the cost effectiveness of a GAB scheme.
Experiment 1.
Consider 180 instances of the optimization problem (P), where α = 1, β = 0.5, γ = 0.5, δ = 1, R varies from 5 to 50, T ∈ {5, 10, 15}, and G varies from G 1 to G 6 . For each of the instances, a GAB scheme is obtained by executing the GAB algorithm, and its cost effectiveness is shown in Fig. 3 . It can be seen that the cost effectiveness of a GAB scheme declines with the available APT resource per unit time.
Many similar experiments exhibit qualitatively similar phenomena. It is concluded that, given all model parameters, the attack duration and the network, the cost effectiveness of a GAB scheme comes down with the available APT resource per unit time. This conclusion manifests that it is unwise to achieve an intended goal by continuously enhancing the available APT resource per unit time. Therefore, the power of APTs is limited. This sounds a good news for cyber defenders. 
The influence of the attack duration
Second, let us examine the influence of the attack duration on the cost effectiveness of a GAB scheme.
Experiment 2. Consider 180 instances of the optimization problem (P)
, where α = 1, β = 0.5, γ = 0.5, δ = 1, R ∈ {5, 10, 15}, T varies from 1 to 50, and G varies from G 1 to G 6 . For each of the instances, an GAB scheme is obtained by running the GAB algorithm, and its cost effectiveness is shown in Fig. 4 . It can be seen that (1) for small attack durations, the cost effectiveness of a GAB scheme goes sharply up with the attack duration, and (2) for larger attack durations, the cost effectiveness of a GAB scheme goes slowly up with the attack duration.
Many similar experiments exhibit qualitatively similar phenomena. It is concluded that, given all model parameters, the available APT resource per unit time and the network, the cost effectiveness of a GAB scheme first rises dramatically and then tends to satuation with the attack duration. This conclusion demonstrates that, although shortterm APTs exhibit formidable power, long-term APTs are generally not wise. Again, this is a good news for cyber defenders. (1) for small attack durations, the cost effectiveness of a GAB scheme goes sharply up with the attack duration, and (2) for larger attack durations, the cost effectiveness of a GAB scheme goes slowly up with the attack duration.
The influence of the network heterogeneity
The heterogeneity of a network is defined as the average deviation of the degree of a node in the network from the average degree of the network. Formally, the heterogeneity of network G = (V, E) is defined as
The heterogeneities of the six trees shown in Fig. 2 are given as follows. Next, examine the influence of the heterogeneity of the network on the cost effectiveness of a GAB scheme.
Experiment 3. Consider 36 instances of the optimization problem (P), where α = 1, β = 0.5, γ = 0.5, δ = 1, G varies from G 1 to G 6 , (a) R ∈ {5, 10, 15}, T = 10; (b) R = 10, T ∈ {10, 20, 30}. For each of the instances, a GAB scheme is obtained by performing the GAB algorithm, and its cost effectiveness is shown in Fig. 5 . It can be seen that the cost effectiveness of a GAB scheme falls off with the network heterogeneity.
Many similar experiments exhibit qualitatively similar phenomena. It is concluded that, given all model parameters, the attack budget per unit time and the attack duration, the cost effectiveness of a GAB attack strategy decreases with the increase of the heterogeneity of the cyber network. This conclusion suggests that, to resist against APT attacks effectively, the defender should connect his computers in a heterogeneous way rather than in a homogeneous way. 
Five types of heuristic APT resource allocation schemes
In this section, we propose and study five types of heuristic APT resource allocation schemes.
Description of the heuristic APT resource allocation schemes
The first type of heuristic APT resource allocation schemes are intended to attack a highest-rank node using all available APT resource, leaving all the remaining nodes untouched. We refer to such schemes as Highest-Rank (HR)
schemes. Given an instance of the optimization problem (P), a HR scheme is formulated as
where the targeted node is of the highest rank.
The second type of heuristic APT resource allocation schemes are intended to attack a lowest-rank node using all available APT resource, leaving all the remaining nodes untouched. We refer to such schemes as Lowest-Rank (LR)
schemes. Given an instance of the optimization problem (P), a LR scheme is formulated as
where the attacked node is of the lowest rank.
The third type of heuristic APT resource allocation schemes are intended to attack each node using APT resource that is linearly proportional to its rank. We refer to such schemes as Rank-First (RF) schemes. Given an instance of the optimization problem (P), a RF scheme is formulated as
The fourth type of heuristic APT resource allocation schemes are intended to attack each node using APT resource that is inversely linearly proportional to its rank. We refer to such schemes as Rank-Last (RL) schemes. Given an instance of the optimization problem (P), a RL scheme is formulated as
).
The fifth type of heuristic APT resource allocation schemes are intended to attack each node using the same resource. We refer to such schemes as Uniform (UN) schemes. Given an instance of the optimization problem (P), a UN attack strategy is formulated as
An experimental comparison
At first glance, it is not clear which one of the five types of heuristic resource allocation schemes is the best in terms of the cost effectiveness. Now, let us conduct an experimental comparison among these schemes as well as GAB schemes. Many similar experiments exhibit qualitatively similar phenomena. It is concluded that, for any instance of the optimization problem, (1) the GAB scheme outperforms all the five heuristic schemes, (2) the RF, RL, and UN schemes are comparable, (3) the RF, RL and UN schemes are superior to the HR scheme, which in turn is better than the LR scheme. This conclusion strongly suggests that GAB schemes are good APT resource allocation schemes. (1) the GAB scheme outperforms all the five heuristic schemes, (2) the RF, RL and UN schemes are comparable, (3) the RF, RL and UN schemes are superior to the HR scheme, which in turn is better than the LR scheme.
Concluding remarks
This paper has coped with the APT effectiveness optimization problem. First, an APT-related cyber attack-defense process has been modeled as a dynamical system, and the APT effectiveness optimization problem has boiled down to a constrained optimization problem. Second, a type of good APT resource allocation schemes known as GAB schemes has been derived by solving the established optimization problem using a well-designed genetic algorithm. Next, the influences of different factors on the cost effectiveness of a GAB scheme have been concluded through computer simulations. Finally, five types of heuristic APT resource allocation schemes have been presented and studied. This work opens a door to a comprehensive understanding of APTs.
There still remain lots of problems about APTs. While this work is done based on an intuitively rational defense mechanism, it is unclear whether the mechanism is the best one when facing APT attacks. This work builds on the assumption that the defense mechanism is known to the attacker. It is worthwhile to study the more complex problem of maximizing the effectiveness of an APT in case that the defense posture is unknown. This work assumes that the attack and defense schemes are both unvaried over time. In practice, the attacker may alter the attack scheme to chase the highest profit, while the defender may change the defense scheme to maximize the security. In such scenarios, the modeling of cyber attack-defense processes would involve optimal control theory [33, 34] or/and game theory [35, 36] .
